On September 6
1976, just before the second, disastrous earthquake that same month, the
Regional Council established the ‘Extraordinary General Secretariat for the
Reconstruction of Friuli’, a technical office responsible for managing the
reconstruction process for at least a decade. Engineer Emanuele Chiavola
was appointed Head of the new office.
The
Secretariat acted as a permanent and operational point of contact between the
Regional Government and the territory, as well as serving as a communication
hub between technicians and local administrators. It was divided into three
sections: administrative, technical, and assistance. Two distinct types of
technical bodies operated within the Secretariat: the Central Interdisciplinary
Group (Gruppo Interdisciplinare Centrale - CIG), also known as Group A,
and Group B. The CIG comprised 29 professionals: 16 engineers, 9
architects, 2 surveyors, an industrial expert, and Professor Miha Tomacevitz
from the Institute for Research on Materials and Structures of Ljubljana (Zavod
za raziskavo materiala in Konstrukcij - ZRMK). As previously mentioned,
a technical collaboration between the Secretariat and the Institute was already
in progress. Group A was responsible for programming and coordination
tasks, particularly the formulation of technical regulations for designing and
directing works. By the end of 1979, this task force had grown to comprise 41
members.
In 1977, Group
A established reconstruction guidelines in the Technical Documents attached
to Regional Law No. 30 dated June 20 1977, the renowned Documenti Tecnici, or
DTs, which are still widely recognised as useful today. The DTs standardised a
design and intervention methodology, preventing professionals from working in
different and individual ways.
The first of
these documents (DT1) provided instructions for presenting projects, listed the
documents to be attached to graphic elaborations, and defined the content these
had to include. It also defined the format of graphical template sheets and the
symbols to be used to indicate structural damage and demolition. DT2 compiled
the Recommendations for the structural repair of masonry buildings,
providing instructions on the techniques and technologies to be applied to make
existing masonry buildings earthquake-resistant while taking into account
various construction types. Based on the handbooks published by the Centre for
Applied Research and Documentation (Centro di Ricerca Applicata e
Documentazione - CRAD), which was set up by the Chamber of Commerce of Udine in
collaboration with the ZRMK of Ljubljana, as well as studies by other
institutes, including the Polytechnic University of Milan, DT2 was updated
several times based on practical experience gained on the ground during
reconstruction. DT4 was designed for tender specifications and explained how to
manage relations between contracting stations and construction companies. It
also described the materials to be used and their characteristics. DT5, also
known as the ‘Unified Price List’, standardised the items that were to be
included in the specifications from an economic perspective. DT6 provided
instructions on the procedure to follow and the forms to use for executing a
public intervention designed by the Group B teams. DT7 defined the
technical and economic parameters that were essential for deciding whether to
proceed with repairing a building.
The 14 technical documents published between October 1977 and
December 1981 were complex in content and procedures, but easy to consult.
Featuring practical examples, they were designed for professionals and
companies. The fifteenth document, which was to contain the final data on the
reconstruction, was never published. As Luciano Di Sopra said, the technical
documents provided «a significant overall rationalisation of the process, in
the face of an action atomised into tens of thousands of individual cases». Di
Sopra was commissioned by the Regional Government to draw up the damage
estimate. He carried out decisive work for both the classification of the
earthquake-hit areas, to which economic aid was destined, and the definition of
the guidelines for a possible national framework law for dealing with
calamities. Ultimately, however, this national legislation project was never
enacted.
The second set of multiple entities operating within the Extraordinary
General Secretariat consisted of the Group B work teams. Each unit brought
together technicians responsible for the design, management, support, and
accounting of the works, as well as ensuring their regular execution. A total
of 56 of these units were formed to cover all the earthquake-stricken Municipalities,
with each comprising nine members. In total, 162 engineers, 125 architects, 220
surveyors, and 77 construction experts were involved, as well as eight design
companies. Working directly in the affected areas, the Group B work
teams were responsible for implementing the DTs in the reconstruction works.
As previously mentioned, Regional Law No. 30 dated June 20 1977, gave
individual citizens the option to either carry out the repair or reconstruction
of their own home independently, or to delegate such operations to the relevant
public authority. In the first case, applications were simply submitted to the
local councils, which processed them and, if approved, awarded the grants
directly. These amounts could reach 60 or 80 per cent of the «admitted sum» and
were paid in three instalments, with 50 per cent paid at the start of the
works. Eligible expenses were determined by limits on the cubic volume of the
building, its intended use, and the number of property units within the
structure. The relevant Group B work team assigned to the specific
territory verified the regularity of the project and the validity of the
estimated amount, either approving it or requesting modifications or additional
information. «To someone», wrote Diego Carpenedo, an engineer and member of Group
A, «it seemed a risky move to entrust the Mayors with the task of receiving
applications from their residents, administering the related procedures and
granting contributions, given the small size of many of the Municipalities
impacted by the earthquake and consequently their modest operational scope. The
facts proved the pessimists wrong, demonstrating the high quality of technical
assistance provided by the Group B work teams cooperating with the
Municipalities». Allowing private individuals to proceed independently and with
their local administrations resulted in the creation of a network of small
businesses, craftsmen, and individual workers who would otherwise have been
excluded from the rebuilding process. Their involvement indeed served to
accelerate the reconstruction process.
If, instead, a private citizen renounced the contribution and entrusted
the municipality with all fulfilments, regaining possession of the property at
the end of the works, the Group B teams would oversee the entire
process, from design to project management. Overall, 40 per cent of those
entitled opted for public intervention, primarily citizens with lower incomes,
indicating extraordinary trust in the public administration. This resulted in
considerable cost savings in the reconstruction of damaged private properties.
The original plan was based on the principle that Group B work
teams were equipped to compensate for the limited technical expertise and
insufficient staffing levels of Municipal offices. However, the limited
capacity and inability of the local authorities to rebuild entire towns were an
immediate and significant bottleneck that the system only partly addressed. In
fact, the Group B experts assisted the Municipal technicians, but also
continued to carry out their private professional activities. Chiavola also
reflected on the modest results obtained from public-private collaboration,
attributing them to the «pressures of the citizens and the Mayors». The use of
freelance professionals ultimately «undermined the operation, causing general
complications».
Another key feature of the Friuli Model was the Central Operational
Office, which has already been discussed. This department was
responsible for involving all the main parties in resolving issues of
significant public interest, such as public procurement.
In addition, the technical and administrative staff of the Autonomous
Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia deserve recognition for their efforts in
overcoming the challenges presented by a severe crisis that could have derailed
any work routine. Having been established just over a decade earlier, the new
regional body had not yet experienced the uncontrolled expansion of
competencies and staffing levels that would characterise Italian regionalism
following the establishment of the Regions with ordinary statute. Perhaps this
was also due to the fact that a new generation of civil servants worked there,
resulting in the regional staff providing an impressive level of dedication and
commitment.
Overall, the technical authorities in Friuli Venezia Giulia responded
extremely positively, although not everything functioned ideally in every area.
This was due not only to the complexity of the situation and the enormous tasks
facing the worlds of economy, politics, and public administration, but also to
the sheer scale of the challenges they faced.