When it comes to resilience in the event of an
earthquake, it depends not only on how people respond during the most critical
stage of the emergency and how well they manage the recovery process, but also
on how well the territory is prepared for a catastrophic event.
From this perspective, Friuli had no specific
frameworks designed to mitigate earthquake damage or cope with emergencies in
the mid-1970s. Its housing stock largely resembled that of traditional
agricultural societies, and despite the historically high seismic risk in the
area, both the population and the authorities regarded earthquakes as an act of
fate. Friuli Venezia Giulia was certainly not an exception among Italian
regions in terms of this lack of preparation. Events that preceded the
catastrophe in Friuli, such as the relatively recent Belìce earthquake (1968)
and the much earlier Messina earthquake (1908, 7.1 Mw), the deadliest natural
disaster in European history, did not result in the development of specific
scientific or organisational response structures for seismic catastrophes.
Although the First Civil Protection Law was enacted following the
Florence flood of 1966, essential implementing regulations had yet to be
established.
In order to explain the extraordinary reaction to the
impact of the earthquake, two elements require consideration. First,
approximately 100,000 Italian army soldiers were stationed in Friuli, a
territory in the far north-east of the Italian peninsula bordering the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This resulted in the mobilisation of
thousands of soldiers in the hours immediately following the earthquake on May
6. A substantial number of troops continued to be deployed in the area for many
months, and they were soon adequately equipped and able to operate autonomously
and in an organised manner.
The second element is more cultural, if not
psychological. In the sixty years before the earthquake, the Region of Friuli
Venezia Giulia had experienced two devastating wars. The First World War was
fought in this area, and the destruction it caused, stretching from the Alps to
the Adriatic, was immense. Following the Battle of Caporetto, the entire
regional area up to the Piave River was invaded and subjected to harsh
occupation for a year. Still reeling from the upheaval of the Great War, the
Friulans then endured twenty months of foreign occupation and a de facto
annexation to Hitler's Third Reich, culminating in a proud yet very costly
period of resistance. The historical experience of these harsh trials proved to
be a significant psychological asset for the Friulian population. It encouraged
them to confront the tragedy of the earthquake with resilience, transforming
their suffering into the motivation needed to rebuild their future.
The two principles on which the reconstruction was
conceived were foundational elements of a conscious vision of resilience. The
motto that Friuli had to be reborn ‘where it was and as it was’ provided an
initial guideline for how to proceed. Rebuilding the towns on the foundations
of what had been destroyed rather than elsewhere meant prioritising the
continuity of communities and the permanence of inhabitants in their places. It
also meant entrusting citizens with the responsibility of creating the community
of the future for themselves and their descendants. It was clear that
rebuilding ‘exactly as it was’ would be impossible, ahistorical and dangerous.
Consequently, the most up-to-date technical knowledge available at the time was
used to develop anti-seismic techniques for the reconstruction of buildings,
which were then extensively standardised. These methods were also refined based
on experience gained directly on site. This large-scale process of learning
by doing enabled technicians, professionals and workers to develop their
skills first-hand in the field.
In general, the response was flexible, adapting to the
situation as it developed. For example, an important lesson was learned at the
beginning of the reconstruction process, which started after the initial
earthquake in May but was then abruptly halted and somewhat undermined by the
subsequent tremors in September. People realised that moving quickly ‘from
tents to houses’ would compromise the quality of the reconstruction and expose
the territory to future dangers. This is what specialists call «evolutionary
and transformative resilience»: a response that can adapt to evolving problems
by opening up to external contributions, with the aim of creating something
useful in the long term. In this sense, adopting anti-seismic construction
techniques that had already been tested in the former Yugoslavia was an
exemplary move that made a significant contribution.
The second guiding principle of reconstruction, which
also originated from the grassroots, was ‘first the factories, then the houses,
then the churches’. This concept was valuable because it promoted the idea that
reconstruction, economic development, and social progress are all
interconnected and require an integrated approach. The document unanimously
approved by the Regional Council on February 1 1977 already referred to the
Regional General Urban Plan (Piano Urbanistico Regionale Generale - PURG), which
had been drawn up immediately before the catastrophe. The recommendation was to
integrate the reconstruction process into the wider strategic development
framework for all of Friuli Venezia Giulia. Various factors contributed to the
pursuit of this parallel objective, as will be explained in more detail,
including the open and proactive nature of Friulian industrial
entrepreneurship. Many of these business leaders were young, and their
companies were in an expansion phase. They saw the earthquake as an opportunity
to respond with resilience and pride.
Another lesson that can be drawn from the experience
of 1976 in Friuli, and the years that followed, is that the reconstruction of a
territory so deeply impacted cannot focus solely on buildings but must give
serious consideration to the safety of the area as a whole: through urban
planning tools that must define how and where to rebuild, thanks to specific
interventions in civil engineering, technical geology and hydraulic-forestry
engineering to consolidate buildings and infrastructure, with the aim of preventing
future landslides and instability.
In addition, the particular emphasis placed on
preserving, and in some cases recreating, places for socialising was a defining
feature of the reconstruction. This focus on the communities and relationships
was clear from the very beginning, during the emergency and post-emergency
phases, in the organisation of tent cities, caravan villages and temporary
settlements, and in the accommodation of thousands of displaced people in
holiday resorts during the winter of 1976–1977: everywhere, the highest
priority was given to providing shared spaces where people, particularly those
not in employment, could meet and spend time together, thus avoiding the risk
of becoming lonely and mourning those who had been lost. Rebuilding a territory
after an earthquake or any other disaster – this is the lesson – is not merely
about putting walls back up, getting offices or factories up and running again,
or maintaining basic community cohesion. It is also about paying attention to
the spirit of each individual, and caring for the most vulnerable and those who
are alone. The selfless dedication of the thousands of volunteers who supported
the people of Friuli during those difficult months was one of the most
significant moments in the history of our national community.
«The principles underlying post-earthquake
reconstruction,» reflected Stefano Grimaz, «anticipated what United Nations
policies now refer to as Build Back Better, in which recovery is not
regarded as a return to the way things were before, but as an opportunity to
make improvements, setting new goals and standards for development and quality
of life. Essentially, the reconstruction process was one of the earliest
examples of transformative resilience, years ahead of its time». With the
extension of the A23 motorway between the train station of Carnia and Coccau,
the double-track upgrade of the Pontebbana railway line, as well as road and
infrastructure investments extending beyond the area directly struck by the
earthquake, rebuilding operations have been a driving force for change and have
accelerated the development of the territory.
As with all sudden transformations, not everything
could be preserved or retained. A great deal was demolished in the early stages
and never rebuilt, and not all of the ‘modern’ solutions proved to be of equal
quality and significance. Another issue that is rarely considered is the
overall cost of rebuilding homes for individuals and households. Alongside the
subsidies received from the state, many families invested all their life
savings, as well as a significant amount of their own time and hard work, in rebuilding
their homes. Many were forced to take on debt, thereby reducing their ability
to make productive investments or spend their income freely. To some extent,
Friuli experienced a ‘stagnation of wealth’ phenomenon following the
earthquake, which had a particularly negative impact on savings. This
subsequently led to various negative repercussions.
From the 1990s onwards, many of the towns that were
rebuilt according to the old urban plan were swept up in the wave of
uncontrolled urban sprawl that spread across much of the eastern Po Valley.
This was characterised by the continuous expansion of built-up areas and
intensive industrial and commercial use of land. However, this was probably an
inevitable fate for Friuli, as it was for all other areas of Italy that
experienced a slower transition to modern economic development, undergoing a
phase of more intense and radical transformation during the last quarter of the
twentieth century.