As previously mentioned with
regard to the initial emergency response, on May 7, the Italian Council of
Ministers convened in Rome under the presidency of Aldo Moro and appointed
Giuseppe Zamberletti as Extraordinary Government Commissioner. Five days later,
in a second session, Italian Decree Law No. 227 was approved. This legislation
provided for the first urgent measures and granted the Autonomous Region of
Friuli Venezia Giulia general authority for reconstruction purposes.
At the start of the following
week, an initial review of the proposals submitted by the Regional Departments
to address the emergency was conducted at a meeting held at the Secretariat of
the Italian Council of Ministers. Those in attendance included Antonio Comelli,
the President of the Region; Mario Toros, a native of Udine who was serving as
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare; and Pier Giorgio Bressan, an elected
deputy who was also from Udine. During the meeting, Aldo Moro, the President of
the Italian Council of Ministers, appeared at the door and immediately asked
Comelli whether the Region had the courage and energy to take institutional
responsibility for the reconstruction. As is well known, Comelli answered in
the affirmative. He had been asked the same question as early as May 8 1976,
during the President of the Council's visit to Gemona. After seeking the
approval of the Regional Councillor, Salvatore Varisco, and the Mayor of
Gemona, Comelli agreed to take on this enormous responsibility.
Diego Carpenedo, one of the key
figures in the reconstruction, has publicly questioned why Moro took this
course of action. Over time, three possible reasons have been suggested. First,
the President had a special connection with Friuli, a territory of Italy whose
values aligned closely with his own. Second, the modest results achieved in the
reconstruction of the Belìce valley in Sicily were by then under public
scrutiny. The third reason can be traced back to the moral debt he had incurred
with Friuli Venezia Giulia. In the months preceding the earthquake, Moro had
commissioned a draft law for the allocation of funds pursuant to Article 50 of
the Regional Statute for the «execution of organic development programmes».
However, the fall of his Fifth Government (which had lasted only 77 days) in
April interrupted that process. Nevertheless, Moro was determined to honour his
commitment to the Region and its Government. This approach would have bolstered
the Council politically, given that it only comprised his own Christian
Democracy Party (Democrazia Cristiana - DC), the Italian Democratic Socialist
Party (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano - PSDI), and the Italian
Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano - PRI), and relied on a slender
majority of just 31 out of 61 Regional Councillors.
The left-wing parties that
formed the opposition, the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano
- PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano - PSI), the
latter of which had left the Regional Government in October 1975 after nine
years in power, saw the earthquake as an opportunity to reinstate the DC as the
anchor of an expanded centre-left coalition. The delayed response to the
earthquake in May led to widespread dissatisfaction, which played into the
hands of those seeking to destabilise the current three-party coalition.
Notably, the PSI was committed
to restoring the centre-left coalition and waged a hard battle in the Regional
Council against the Government led by Comelli, but this did not pay off at the
ballot box. In the political elections on June 20 and 21 1976, 95 per cent of
those eligible voted, which was a slight increase compared to four years
earlier. Indeed, political bipolarism was reinforced. The DC remained the
strongest party in Friuli Venezia Giulia, winning 38.7 per cent of the vote.
The PCI came a close second with 34.4 per cent, while the PSI received just 9.6
per cent. Thus, despite fears to the contrary, the PCI did not overtake the DC.
Following the debate on the
reactivation of productive activities and the identification of areas for
urgent construction work and expropriations in the public interest in mid-July,
which culminated in the approval of Regional Laws No. 28 dated July 1 1976 and
No. 33 dated July 21 1976, the PCI and PSI decided to withdraw from the Special
Council Commission for earthquake-stricken areas, the establishment of which
had been agreed during the Council session on May 8.
Chaired by Christian Democrat
Salvatore Varisco, the Commission was responsible for establishing and
maintaining communication between the Regional Government and the Council on
all «relevant or urgent matters relating to the seismic event that did not fall
within the scope of the permanent commissions». They met again in September,
when, during the session held in the Council chamber on May 21, Antonio Comelli
appealed for a «pact for reconstruction» between all the local political
groups. He made this appeal in light of the unexpected return of tremors, which
took everyone by surprise just when «we had begun to believe that the seismic
phenomenon was subsiding», and when it was thought that the exodus of
populations from the affected areas would be «only temporary». His appeal aimed
to prevent depopulation and «the death of Friuli».
The informal pact signed by the
political forces, later referred to as the ‘seismic compromise’ in reference to
the ‘historic compromise’ through which the PCI and the DC had been working to
bring the Communist Party into the national government, reconciled the
often-extreme positions of the political factions. It also succeeded in
moderating the demands of the Tent City Movement, which had spilled over into
street protests. This social movement gave voice to young supporters of left-wing
parties not represented in government, who were pressing for reconstruction to
be managed from below as an opportunity to launch a new model of society.
The ‘seismic compromise’ was
the political agreement that drove the post-earthquake reconstruction through
housing policies and territorial redevelopment. This was achieved by using
appropriate framework laws and calls for tenders to support citizens and
businesses in recovering their damaged or lost property. These measures enabled
the rapid approval of the Regional Framework Laws set out in Italian Law No.
546 dated August 8 1977, which delegated extensive decision-making powers to
local mayors and communities. In retrospect, this was one of the most
successful examples of regional subsidiarity, as outlined in Article 118 of the
Italian Constitution.
The redevelopment and upgrading
of the road network was made possible by streamlining bureaucratic procedures.
Structural recovery and the seismic retrofitting of buildings were also
promoted through the issuance of technical regulatory guidance, such as the
Technical Documents (Documenti Tecnici - DT) appended to Regional Law No.
30/1977. There was ongoing dialogue with the Superintendency regarding the
protection of the landscape and traditional and monumental architecture.
Agreements were also reached with construction sector trade associations to
ensure the availability of building materials and maintain price caps.
In the years that followed, the
prospect of a historic agreement between the DC and the PCI at a national level
had faded, and the situation was further deteriorating due to left-wing
terrorism and neo-fascist atrocities. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of
Friuli continued to be based on the pact of unity and cross-party collaboration
forged after the second shock. This was an understanding between Antonio
Comelli's Christian Democracy party and the opposition, particularly the
Italian Communist Party, with the active involvement of all the political and
cultural forces across Friuli.
In this context, the
Extraordinary General Secretariat was joined by the Central Operational Office,
a political body comprising one representative each from the DC, PCI, PSI, PRI,
and PSDI. This body was tasked with facilitating the influx of large companies
with advanced technologies and an adequate workforce from outside Friuli
Venezia Giulia. The party representatives within this body decided on
‘aggregated contracts’, a philosophy that would decline in the decades to come.
As previously discussed, the
Regional Special Commission for Reconstruction was operating during this period
as well. It was initially chaired by Salvatore Varisco, who was elected to the
Regional Council in 1964 as a member of the Christian Democracy Party, becoming
the first Reconstruction Councillor in 1980. Building on the ‘compromise’ that
had been initiated, Varisco was succeeded by Giulio Magrini, who represented
Carnia in the Regional Council from 1973 to 1988 as a member of the PCI group.
Magrini played a key role in shaping the regional legislation that established
mountain communities and in developing the initial guidelines for the rebirth
of Friuli, which had been devastated by earthquakes.
The experience of the Autonomous Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, and
more broadly the efforts of all the institutions and regional leaders involved,
confirmed the wisdom of the political decisions made in the heat of the moment,
starting with Aldo Moro's resolution to entrust the management of the
rebuilding of Friuli directly to the Regional Government.
Thanks to the technical advisory services provided by the Extraordinary
General Secretariat, the efforts of individual professionals and specialist
bodies, the mobilisation of external technical expertise, and the contributions
of workers at various levels, the reconstruction of the earthquake-stricken
area was completed within a decade.